Abstract. We present a new identity based authenticated key agreement protocol from pairings satisfying the required security attributes. The security of our protocol is based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Introduction
Diffie-Hellman protocol [7] is well known two party key exchange protocol. However the basic Diffie-Hellman protocol does not authenticate the two communication parties, hence it suffers from the man-in-themiddle attack. A simple solution would be to combine a key agreement protocol with a digital signature scheme to obtain an authenticated key agreement protocol. Over the years, different approaches have been developed to solve the problem [5, 11, 17, 18] . For instance, the MTI [12] and MQV [11] family of protocols are based on using Certificate Authority to bind an entity's identity with his static (long-term) keys. The final session key is generated by both ephemeral (short-term) keys and static (long-term) keys. The authenticity of the static keys assures that only the entities who possess the static keys are able to compute the session keys. However, in a certification system, before using the public key of a user, the participants must first verify the certificate of the user. As a consequence, this system requires a large amount of computing time and storage.
In 1984, Shamir [16] suggested the concept of identity (ID) based cryptography to simplify key management procedures in certificate-based public key infrastructure. Since then there have been many identity based cryptography like encryption schemes, signature schemes and key agreement schemes [2, 4, 9, 15] etc. Especially many ID based cryptographic schemes are based on the pairings. Many applications using pairings [2, 3, 4, 9, 14, 15] have been proposed in cryptography. Smart [18] proposed an ID based authenticated key (AK) agreement protocol based on Weil pairing, Boneh-Franklin ID based encryption scheme and tripartite Diffie-Hellman protocol. However this scheme is weak if two long term private keys are compromised. Chen and Kudla [5] presented a two-pass AK protocol that overcame the flaw of Smart's protocol. As pointed out in [6] , their scheme is inefficient in terms of performance attributes of AK protocols. Recently Choie et al. [6] suggested an ID based AK protocol that reduced the communication overhead. However, this scheme is less efficient on computational cost than the previous schemes. This paper propose an ID based authenticated key agreement protocol using Weil or Tate pairings which provides the TA forward secrecy, and hence perfect forward secrecy. We also give the security properties of our protocol. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the security attributes of the key agreement protocols, ID based schemes and the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. In section 3, we review some known authenticated key agreement protocols and provide an efficient new identity-based authenticated key agreement scheme.
Preliminaries

Identity based schemes
In 1984, Shamir [16] suggested a public key encryption scheme in which the public key can be an arbitrary string. Shamir's original motivation for identity (ID) based encryption was to simplify certificate management in e-mail systems. When Alice sends mail to Bob at bob@ewha.ac.kr, she simply encrypts her message using the public key string bob@ewha.ac.kr. There is no need for Alice to obtain Bob's public key certificate. When Bob receives the encrypted mail he contacts a third party with trusted authority (TA), which we call Private Key Generater (PKG). Bob authenticates himself to the PKG in the same way he would authenticate himself to a CA and obtains his private key from the PKG. Bob can then read his e-mail. Note that unlike the existing public key infrastructure, Alice can send encrypted mail to Bob even if Bob has not yet setup his public key certificate. Also note that key escrow is inherent in the identity based system since the PKG knows Bob's private key. In such an identity scheme, PKG generates global system parameters and a master-key, generate the private key corresponding to an arbitrary public key string ID ∈ {0,1} * using the master key, and then send the private keys to the users.
Security attributes
A key agreement protocol is a key establishment technique in which a shared secret is derived by two (or more) parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these, such that no party can predetermine the resulting value. A key agreement protocol is said to provide implicit key authentication (of B to A) if A is assured that no other entity besides B can possibly ascertain the value of the secret key. Authenticated key agreement protocol (AK protocol) is a key agreement protocol which provides mutual implicit key authentication. A key agreement protocol provides key confirmation (of B to A) if A is assured that B possesses the secret key. Authenticated key agreement with key confirmation protocol (AKC protocol) provides mutual key authentication and mutual key confirmation. Now we give the desirable security attributes of the key agreement protocols. Known-key security : Each run of the protocol should result in a unique secret session key. The compromise of one session key should not compromise other session keys. Forward secrecy : If long-term private keys of one or more of entities are compromised, the secrecy of previously established session keys should not be affected.
• Partial forward secrecy : If the long-term key of one or more but not all are compromised, the secrecy of previously established session keys should not be affected.
• Perfect forward secrecy : If the long-term key of all entities are compromised, the secrecy of previously established session keys should not be affected.
• TA forward secrecy : If the TA's long-term key is compromised(and hence all users' long-term private keys), the secrecy of previously established session keys should not be affected. Key compromise impersonation : The compromise of an entity A's longterm private key will allow an adversary to impersonate A, but it should not be able the adversary to impersonate other entities to A.
Unknown-key share : If the adversary convinces the user B that he shares some session key with the adversary, while in fact he shares the key with another entity (user A), we call the protocol suffering from unknown-key share attack.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption
Let G 1 be an additive group of prime order l and G 2 be a multiplicative group of the same order l. We assume discrete log problems in G 1 and G 2 are hard. We consider a pairing map e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 satisfying the following properties.
(i) Bilinearity : e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G 1 , and for all a, b ∈ Z * l . (ii) Non-degeneracy : The map does not send all pairs in G 1 × G 1 to the identity in G 2 . Observe that since G 1 and G 2 are groups of prime order this implies that if P is a generator of G 1 , then e(P, P ) is a generator of G 2 . (iii) Computability : Given P, Q ∈ G 1 , e(P, Q) can be efficiently computable.
A bilinear map satisfying the three properties above is said to be an admissible bilinear map. We note that the Weil and Tate pairings associated with supersingular elliptic curves or abelian varieties can be modified to create such bilinear maps. We consider G 1 to be an additive abelian group defined on elliptic curves. We refer to [2, 13] for more details.
We consider an admissible bilinear map e :
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP) : The BDH problem in < G 1 , G 2 , e > is as follows. Given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G 1 , compute e(P, P ) abc ∈ G 2 where a, b, c are randomly chosen from Z * l . An algorithm is said to solve the BDH problem with an advantage of if
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b, c in Z * l , the random choice of P ∈ G * 1 , and the random bits of A. We assume that BDHP is hard, in other words, there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve BDHP with non-negligible probability.
An authenticated key agreement protocol
In this section, we first review the following previous ID based key agreement protocols and then propose a new ID based authenticated key agreement protocol using the pairings.
Previous ID based key agreement protocols
The following schemes own the same system initialization but different public key/private key issuing processes and different key agreement protocols.
(1) Smart's ID based AK protocol [18] (2) Chen-Kudla's ID based AK protocol [5] (3) Modification of Nalla's ID based AK protocol (4) Choie-Jeong-Lee's ID based AK protocol [6] Initialization : Let G 1 and G 2 be two groups of prime order l, where G 1 is an additive group and G 2 is a multiplicative group. The discrete logarithm problems (DLP) in both G 1 and G 2 are assumed to be hard. Let P be a generator of G 1 , and H : {0, 1} * → Z * l be a cryptographic hash function. The key generation center (KGC) chooses a random number s ∈ Z * l and set P pub = sP . The center publishes system parameters Params =< G 1 , G 2 , l, e, P, P pub , H >, and keep s as the master key, which is known only by itself.
In addition to the system initialization, KGC performs the following private key issuing process. The session key is then K = kdf (k AB ) = kdf (k BA ), where kdf : G 2 → {0, 1} * is a key derivation function. As described in [17] , this protocol does not provide full forward secrecy since an adversary who learns S A and S B can compute all session keys established by A and B.
Private key extraction: Let
(2) Chen-Kudla's ID based AK protocol
In [5] , Chen-Kudla suggested a two-pass AK protocol satisfying the KGC forward secrecy property. 
A computes k AB = e(S
The session key is then K = kdf (k AB , aU B ) = kdf (k BA , bU A ), where kdf : G 2 × G 1 → {0, 1} * is a key derivation function. This protocol satisfies desirable security attributes, but is less efficient on the message bandwidth since two points need to be distributed by each user. The one is a modification of variation of Nalla's and the other one is a modification of Smart's protocol. We now review their protocols.
• CJL protocol 1
, and sends U A = aP pub and V A = aS A to B.
, and sends U B = bP pub and V B = bS B to A.
3.
A verifies that e(V B , P ) = e(P B , U B ) and computes k AB = aU B = abP pub . 4. B verifies that e(V A , P ) = e(P A , U A ) and computes k BA = bU A = abP pub .
The session key is
, and sends T A = aP to B.
, and sends T B = bP to A.
The session key is K = kdf (k AB , P A , P B ) = kdf (k BA , P A , P B ). Comparing with CJL protocol 1, CJL protocol 2 has the minimal message bandwidth.
A new ID based key agreement protocol
Suppose two users A and B want to share a common secret. A and B have static private keys S A = sP A and S B = sP B obtained from KGC. Since the initialization and the private key extraction step is same as that of Section 3.1, our scheme can be simplified as follows.
Let kdf : A =⇒ B :
Then the shared common secret between A and B is K = kdf (k A , P A , P B ) = kdf (k B , P A , P B ) = kdf (e(P A , P B ) (a+b)abs , P A , P B ).
Efficiency and security
Each party has three elliptic curve point multiplications, one exponentiation and one evaluation of the pairing map. We compare the number of computations of our protocol with the previous key agreement protocols [18, 5, 14, 6] (Refer to the table 1).
Our scheme is mutual implicit key authenticated and also role symmetric since each party has the same operation to obtain the common session key. We heuristically discuss the security of our protocol.
(i) Security from the man-in-the-middle attack : Let E be an adversary who wants to share a secret key with an entity A as an entity B without the knowledge of S B . E generates V E = a P A and W E = a P B for random numbers a , a and send them to A. Then
Therefore E is not able to share the common key with A. Similarly for B. This implies the proposed scheme is secure from the man in the middle attack.
(ii) Known key security : From the randomness of a and b in our protocol, the session keys in different key agreements are independent of each other. The knowledge of the previous session keys does not help an adversary to derive any future session key. Hence, our protocol provides known-key security. (v) Unknown key share : According to [1] , including the identities of the sender and the intended receiver in the key derivation function can prevent potential unknown key-share attacks. 
Key confirmation process
We describe the AKC protocol which can be derived from an AK protocol by adding the MACs (Message Authentication Code) of the flow number, identities and the ephemeral public keys. Here, MACs are used to provide key confirmation, and d 1 , d 2 are two independent key derivation functions. These two functions could be different since they are often with different inputs from different groups and may be required to produce outputs of different forms. Let F K = d 1 (K), F K = d 2 (K). The method used here is well known in [11] .
Conclusions
We have presented an ID based authenticated key agreement protocol based on pairings and compared the efficiency and security with the two pass authenticated key agreement given by [18, 5, 14, 6] . We discussed the security properties of our protocol. It is also easy to add a key confirmation property to our protocol using message authentication code just as with MQV and the three pass AKC protocol in [18] .
